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The paper will discuss the Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 2004, which was signed into law by 
President Thabo Mbeki on 14 July 2004. The key objective of the Communal Land Rights Act 
(CLRA, 2004), is to  legalise security of tenure in South Africa’s former homelands, home to a 
third of South Africa’s population estimated at 43 million. The logic behind this process is that 
efficient use of land utilization and investment inflows to one of South Africa’s poorest regions 
(the former homelands) will be realized once security of tenure is recognized under statutory law. 
The paper will debunk some of the classical debates around indigenous/communal tenure 
systems vis-à-vis individual tenure systems with respect to their applicability to the 
“modernization” impetus they are perceived to uphold. A textual and sociological critique of the 
Act will be done to validate the inappropriateness of the Act, especially in relation to the 
replacement paradigm it adopts and the administrative, resource and conflict-based challenges it 
is bound to encounter in its implementation.  It will be argued that the Act is a-historical and fails 
to come to terms with the sociological complexity and uniqueness that defines South Africa’s 
rural societies with respect to land matters. This analysis will be complimented with some of the 
lessons learnt from a decade of land reform implementation experience in South Africa and 
Kenya’s land titling experience that commenced in the pre-independence period (1955) right up 
to the post- independence era (1963). 
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         Tenure Reform in Historical Perspective 
The prospect of democracy in the 1990s raised expectations that the dispossessed  African 
population would be able to return to their land, but the terms on which political transition was 
negotiated constrained how this could happen. Despite calls for a radical restructuring of social 
relations in the countryside, the constitutional negotiations on the protection of property rights 
and on the economy more broadly, ensured that land reform would be pursued within the 
framework of a market- led land reform model1. The negotiated transitional arrangements were 
finally endorsed and reflected in the 1996 Constitution, which sets out the following framework 
for land reform: 
 
The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to foster conditions, which enable citizens to gain access to land on equitable 
basis (Section 25(5)). 
 
A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of 
Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress (Section 25 
(6)). 
 
A person or community dispossessed of property after June 1913 as  a result of past 
racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of 
Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to equitable redress (Section 25 (7)). 
 
There are three key pillars in South Africa’s post-1994 Land Reform Policy that reflects the 
constitutional pronouncement around land matters. These are, restitution, redistribution and 
tenure reform. The key aim of land restitution is to restore rights to land to communities or 
individuals who were dispossessed off their land since June 1913 due to racially motivated laws or 
practice. This is a rights driven approach since its overall objective is land rights restoration. 
However, skeptics claim that this has been done at the expense of attaining socio -economic 
development for the claimants. Land redistribution aims to provide communities with a grant 
they can use to purchase land for agricultural purposes through the Land Redistribution for 
Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme. Access to land for residential purposes is 
                                                             
1 A consensual view among academics is that the current land reform policy reflects the key economic and political 
imperatives that came to define South Africa’s negotiated settlement to democratic transition, and the policy tenets 
are a reflection of the comprises that were made during the transition, which undermined its own leverage to 
engender a radical transfer of land. More so, the World Bank’s document, Rural Restructuring Programme (RRP) 
formed the basis of South Africa’s policy. Property rights, market -based and demand-led land reform are often cited 
as some of the key imperatives upon which the terms of transitional process were partly predicated upon. For more 
details see, Levin and Weiner (1997);  Lahiff (2001).  
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financed through the Settlement Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG2) programme. The third pillar of 
the land reform policy is the tenure reform. The broad objective of tenure policy is to create a 
unitary non-racial system of legal tenure rights in South Africa’s former homelands. This has 
recently been legislated through the Communal Land Rights Act (CLRA) 2004, which aims to 
accord legal recognition of insecure land tenure rights. Tenure  and Restitution reforms are land 
rights based mechanisms established to either restore or accord legal recognition to informal land 
tenure regimes that African communities in South Africa hold . The mechanisms established in 
this processes are highly legalistic, judicious, and often disenfranchising for the target 
communities.    
Given the aforesaid, critics have cast doubt on the extent to which a negotiated land 
reform can comprehensively address a century old system of land alienation processes that 
systematically denied ownership of land to the black majority. Within the tenure front, lack of 
secure land rights, chaotic land administrative systems, and the sheer lack of investment in the 
rural areas form part of the daily struggles that rural people have to endure in their struggles for 
social reproduction emanating from land-based livelihood provisioning strategies. These areas 
carry some of the worst forms of poverty in the country because of apartheid social engineering 3 
strategies. Lack of development, collapse of land administrative systems, overlapping and 
conflicting informal land rights regimes are key features endured on a daily basis by the rural 
population.  
For instance, until the 1990s, it was government policy that black people should not own 
land. In townships and ex-homeland areas, the form that land rights took was generally 
subservient, permit-based or ‘held in trust’. The land was generally registered as the property of 
the government or the South African Development Trust. Approximately 17 million hectares, 
which translates to 13% of the country, is held in this manner, including most of the so-called 
former homelands and colored reserves. In many areas, the administration of this land is 
inefficient and chaotic such that people who have lived on the same land for generations may 
find that they have no legal right to the land in questio n. Even if nobody disputes that, they are 
the rightful owners of the land (Thomas et al. 1999; Claassens 2000). Hence, one of the issues 
that inhibit development is the lack of clarity about the status of land rights in communal areas. 
Who has what rights?  Who must agree to changes?  Who has the legal authority to transact land? 
(PLAAS/NLC  2003).  
                                                             
2 Initially, i.e. between 1994-1999, SLAG was used to purchase land for settlement purposes and agricultural 
purposes. In 2000, this was changed and SLAG become available only for applicants keen to purchase land for 
settlement purposes. Acquiring land for production purposes was dealt with through the LRAD programme.   
3 Social engineering here is used to refer to the social and economic restructuring that was initiated by the former 
regime  based on politically defined objectives.  
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    As a result, insecurity of tenure in the communal areas is one of the greatest threats the 
land reform programme is yet to tackle in its attempt to de-racialize the dual property regime 
South Africa inherited. Even though rights that people hold seem “strong” in reality, they are 
often weak in terms of their jurisprudential validity. Since land is owned by the state, the people 
who hold these rights hold derivative  or secondary rights. These forms of rights are not acquired 
on basis of membership, but rather on basis of occupation and use over a period of time and 
most of the time, these rights tend to be nested, i.e. operate at different levels of social 
organization that cut across the community, tribe and family (Cousins 2003). Rights held by 
women in this regard are even weaker than their male counterparts due to customary practice. 
The existence of male dominated traditional authorities exacerbates this sit uation. Most of these 
administrative systems tend to be corrupt and this worsens land use and allocation systems in 
these areas4. In addition, local government plans and service delivery interventions are thwarted 
or delayed by chiefs refusing to “release” land for development projects5 (Lahiff 2001 ; Adams et 
al. 2000: 117). With the dawn of democracy in South Africa in 1994, concerted attempts have 
been put into place in order to address the question of governance, and ownership in communal 
areas.  
 Certain interim measures were developed to improve the tenure securities of the former 
homeland people in the post - 1994 period. In 1996, the Interim Protection of Informal Land 
Rights Act 31 (IPILRA) was passed. This aimed to provide protection for the land rights of 
people living in the former “homelands” against abuses such as the sale of their land by corrupt 
chiefs (Ibsen and Turner 2000). This Bill was intended to be in force for two years but was 
subsequently renewed in 1998 and 1999 as the legal drafting of a more comprehensive tenure 
policy continued.   
Other significant laws that were promulgated were, the Land Reform (Labor Tenants) 
Act, the Extension of Security of Tenure Act and the Communal Property Association Act. The 
Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996 provides for the establishment of legal entities 
that will enable groups of beneficiaries to acquire, hold and manage property on a communal 
basis within a supportive legislative framework. The Act requires that these primary objectives be 
                                                             
4 see Ntebeza (2004: 10) He argues that in the early 1990s, corruption was its zenith in these institutions. For 
example, along the Wild Coast in the Old Transkei,  ‘whites’, were illegally allocated cottage sites in exchange for a 
bottle of Brandy. These sites were termed as ‘brandy sites’ because it was imperative that applications were 
accompanied by a bottle of brandy.  
5 In a study the author conducted between 1997-1998 in Mpumalanga Province, South Africa, the institutional 
conflicts that ensued between the local councillors, officials of Provincial  Department of Land Affairs, and the Tribal 
Leadership of Emjidini with respect to the Emjidini Redistribution Project clearly captures the dilemmas that 
confronts Provincial, and Local Government in dealing with development matters in communal areas, where Chiefs 
are steadfast to consolidate their powers along land governance, ownership and development matters of their 
constituencies.  
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fulfilled in accordance with a written constitution embodying the principles of democracy, 
inclusion, non-discrimination, equality, transparency and accountability. The Act provides an 
important and necessary alternative for communities that aspire to hold and manage land on a 
communal basis (Makopi 1999: 144).  
On the other hand, the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA) 
addresses the relationship between occupiers and owners, as well as the circumstances under 
which evictions can take place and the procedures to be followed. The Act is underpinned by the 
following principles: the law should prevent arbitrary and unfair evictions; existing rights of 
ownership should be recognized and protected; and people who live on land belonging to other 
people should be guaranteed basic human rights. In essence, this law promotes long-term security 
on the land where people are living now. None of these laws, however, deals with the complex 
system of administering tenure in the former homelands and state-owned land that is the result of 
a myriad of inconsistent laws, proclamations, regulations and procedures (Hornby 2000:312). 
Furthermore, the capacity, procedures and approaches of the institutions charged with protecting 
the rights of farm dwellers, and responding to threatened evictions, have substantially shaped the 
impact of ESTA. Most of the time, occupiers either do not know their rights or, even if they do, 
they are unable to exercise these rights. At worst, this Act combines weak substantive rights with 
strong procedural requirements and relies on institutions that are at worst hostile to ESTA such 
as the magistrates and police, which are inadequately resourced to enforce these procedural 
rights. The Land Reform (Labor Tenants) Act 3 of 1996, differs from ESTA in that it not only 
places restrictions on the eviction of labor tenants from farms but also gives tenants the right to 
claim stronger rights, including ownership to the land they use. For instance it allows labor 
tenants to obtain long term sec ure independent tenure rights through the purchase of the land 
they currently use or alternative land (Hall 2003: 9). 
 In the period of the first democratic government, 1994-99, an effort was made to develop 
the Land Rights Bill, which aimed to upgrade customary rights by giving them statutory 
recognition without changing their essential customary character (Adams 2001). However, 
immediately following the second general elections in June 1999, the proposed Land Rights Bill 
was shelved. The ostensible reasons for this change in direction were to place greater reliance for 
land administration on the traditional authorities and thus reduce the burden on the state. 
Legislation was to have been prepared to transfer state land in the former homelands to tribes 
(Adams 2001; Ibsen and Turner 2000 ).  
 The defunct Land Rights Bill had proposed that people in the homelands would be given 
“protected land rights”. The Minister of Land Affairs would remain the nominal owner of the 
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land. The protected rights would be under the management control of their holders. Again, these 
rights holders might be individuals or duly constituted groups. Groups would have to satisfy 
criteria with regard to their conformity to constitutional principles, and majority decision-making  
processes would govern their land management. Protected rights could be registered if their 
holders so desired, although they would exist even if they were not registered. If this Bill came 
into force, it would have conferred protected rights on all those currently holding land rights in 
the former “homelands” (Ibsen and Turner 2000, Adams 2001).  
 The other key aspect of the defunct Land Rights Bill was that it had a redistributive 
aspect. In cases where it was impossible to confer rights in areas where such rights are competing 
with others, “tenure awards” were to be conferred in the form of additional land (Ibsen and 
Turner 2000). However, the B ill was deemed too controversial to be passed at a time when South 
Africa was gearing up for the second democratic elections in May 1999. Part of the controversy 
centered on the Bills silence on the role traditional authorities6 had in the changes in land 
management systems in the former homelands. 
The new Minister  of Land Affairs–Thoko Didiza put a halt to this work in 1999  
following a pre-election pact between the president-to-be, Thabo Mbeki, and the Congress of 
Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA). This pact was critical for the African 
National Congress (ANC) if they were to secure the votes of traditional leaders and their subjects 
in densely populated areas such as those in Kwazulu-Natal, which is an IFP (Inkatha Freedom 
Party) stronghold. The CLRA therefore emerged as a response to these changing political 
contexts, and vested interests that ensured their concerns are enshrined in the making of the 
CLRA.  
Since 1999, the making of the Communal land Rights Act has been characterized by 
protracted tensions, mainly centering on the role of traditional authorities. At the heart of this 
contestation was; should land be transferred to Traditional Authorities or Communities, who will 
then decide on what kind of legal entity should administer their land? For instance as Ntsebeza 
(2004: 20-21) notes, the Communal Land Rights Act draft that was gazetted on 14th August 2002 
proposed the transfer of registrable land rights to individuals, families and communities. On land  
administration, it divested traditional authorities of their land administration functions, including 
land allocation in favor of democratically elected  administrative structures. Where applicable, 
legitimate traditional authorities were accorded ex officio representation not exceeding 25 per cent. 
                                                             
6 The position of the ANC towards traditional authorities has always been ambivalent despite the “pariah status” 
they hold in most of South Africa’s former homelands or within certain community quarters partly due to their 
historical role in the apartheid era and the corruption associated with some of them. The ANC strategy of 
broadening its support base in rural South Africa, coupled by the support of these institutions within some quarter of  
the ANC has partly created this dilemma and subsequent conflicts between elected government officials and 
unelected officials hailing from the tribal lineage.   
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The draft Act clearly attempted to  strike a balance between the constitutional obligation to extend 
democracy to all parts of the country, including rural areas, and accommodating the institution of 
traditional leadership, which is recognized in the constitution. Traditional Leaders opposed the 
draft Act and even threatened bloodshed in their constituencies if the bill was to be passed in 
parliament.  
Because of their pressure and contestation, the Act was amended giving traditional 
authorities significant powers about land allocation7. The drafting process of this Act begun in 
April 2001 (Adams 2001). Parliamentary hearings on the Communal Land Rights Act were held 
in November 2003, and a total of 34 submissions were made, and three of these called for the 
withdrawal of the bill8. This process came to completion when it was passed in parliament on 
February 2004 and signed into law by President Mbeki, on 14 July 2004. A consensual view that 
has emerged is that CLRA will not succeed because it is complex, gendered, and at dissonance 
with some of the fundamental principles of the constitution of South Africa such as the right to 
gender equality. The bill is based on the premise that South Africa has an advanced and well-
resourced  land administrative system, but experience with the implementation of land reform 
since its inception in 1994 proves otherwise.  
 
     Communal Land Rights Act, 2004: An Explanatory Overview 
The key aims of the CLRA is to, give effect to section 25 (6) of the constitution which 
states that:  
 
A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure because of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of 
Parliament, either to tenure, which is legally secure, or to comparable redress.  
 
The Act aims to give legal recognition to land tenure rights9 on communal land. The Communal 
Land Rights Act also aims to provide for legally secure tenure in communal areas and accord 
comparable  redress where necessary. Its overall aim is to enable the registration and transfer of 
communal land to communities to occur and recognized  under statutory law. This process w ill be 
preceded through a process of land rights enquiry to establish the extent and location of land to 
be transferred to a person or community.  
  The starting point of the Act, which espouses its cardinal objective, is provided for in 
Section 4 (1) and (2) of the Act, respectively: 
                                                             
7 For more details on this process, see Ntsebeza (2004: 21-22) 
8 see Cousins (2004: 1) 
9 Land tenure rights entails the right to own, occupy, use or alienate communal land which is held collectively by the 
members of a community or individual households or persons.  
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A community or person is entitled to the extent and in the manner provided for legally 
secure or to comparable redress if the tenure of land of such community or person is 
legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices. 
 
 An old order right held by a married person is, despite any law, practice, usage or registration to 
the contrary, deemed to be held by all spouses in a marriage in which such person is a spouse, 
jointly in undivided shares irrespective of the matrimonial property regime applicable to such 
marriage and must, on confirmation or conversion in terms of Section 18(3), be registered in the 
names of all such spouse 
 
The bill creates a mechanism for the Minister to institute a land rights enquiry  as 
stipulated in Section 14 (1): 
 
Prior to securing an old order right in terms of Section 4 or transferring communal land 
to a community or person in terms of Section 6 or determining comparable redress in 
terms of Section 12, the Minister must initiate a land rights enquiry. 
 
Based on the report of the land rights enquiry that will stipulate the recommendations 
with respect to rights determination, the Minister will invoke his/ her discretionary powers in 
determining the location and extent of the land to be transferred, nature and extent of the new 
order right and finally the holder or holders of a new order right. The Minister’s determination of 
the rights will have to take cognizance of existing legislations governing spatial planning, local 
government, agriculture and the needs of old rights holders and gender equality10.  
Once these rights are confirmed, converted , conferred or validated by the Minister, they are 
recognized as ‘new order rights’. New order rights are to be recorded in a communal land register 
in terms of the Deeds Registries Act. Any subsequent land allocations or changes to rights are 
also to be recorded. These rights will be formally recognized through the creation of a ‘Deed of 
Communal Land Right’, and may be upgraded to freehold, which would require community 
approval. To achieve the objectives set by the B ill, two key institutions are to be established; the 
Land Administrative Committees (LAC) and the Land Rights Board (LRB). 
 
Land Administration Committees 
This committee will be tasked with the allocation of new order rights to persons including 
women, the disabled and the youth in accordance with law and the registration of communal land 
                                                             
10 Section 18(2)(3) of the Communal Land Rights Act provides a lengthy detail of the requisite conditions the 
Minister has to consider in his/her rights determination.   
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and of new order rights. It will also establish and maintain registers and records of all new order 
rights and any transactions affecting such rights. The committee will also be expected to facilitate 
development processes in the community through liaising with the relevant municipality, land 
rights board and any other relevant institution. It is also expected to unify community members 
and promote and safeguard their interests. In terms of its membership, the total number of its 
members will be determined by the community rules11 but its composition must consist of:  
 
• women have to constitute one third of the total membership;  
• one member of land administration committee must represent the interests of vulnerable 
members i.e. women, children and the youth, the elderly and the disabled;  
• the Minister, in respect of the Department of Land Affairs; and 
• the chairperson of the relevant Land Rights Board;  
• the relevant provincial Member of the Executive Council for agriculture;  
• the relevant provincial Member of the Executive Council for local government matters;   
and 
• every municipality in the respective jurisdiction may designate a person to be a non-
voting member of a land administration committee.  
 
However, no member of a land administration committee must be persons holding any 
traditional leadership position in the community. But if, a traditional council12 exists within the 
respective jurisdiction, the functions and powers of the land administration committee of such 
community may be performed and exercised by the relevant traditional council13. Where 
traditional councils exists, and they have to execute the functions of a land administration 
committee they will have to make sure that the composition of their membership reflects that of 
the Land Administration Committees over and above the generic composition of a Traditional 
Council14.  
                                                             
11 Section 19 and 20 of the CLRA deals with the content and making of community rules. It is mandatory for a 
community to register its own rules prior to any registration of communal land taking place.  
12 Traditional Councils are established under the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Bill, 2003. 
Once a traditional community is recognised under Section 2 of TLGF Bill, that community must set up a traditional 
council as stipulated under section 3 of the TLGF Bill. 
13 Section 21 (2) of the Act provides this as an option.  
14 As mandated in Section 3 (2) of t he Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Bill, a Traditional Council 
should have not more than 30 members in its council, a third of the members should be women, and the members 
of a traditional council must comprise traditional leaders and members of the traditional community selected by 
senior traditional leaders. Overall, 40% of its members must be democratically elected and should hold a term of 
office of five years. 
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Land Rights Board 
The key functions of the land rights board  are mainly to advice the Minister and the community 
affected by the Bill. The Board will liaise with all spheres of government and  monitor compliance 
with the constitution and the CLRA. The membership of the Board should comprise of the 
following: 
• one representative from each of the organs of State, as determined by the Minister; 
• two members nominated by each Provincial House of Traditional Leaders having 
jurisdiction in the area of that Board;  
• one member nominated by institutions or persons in the commercial or industrial sector; 
and 
• seven members from the affected communities, of whom at least two must be women; 
one must represent the interests of child -headed households; one must represent the 
interests of persons with disabilities; and  one must represent the interests of the youth. 
 
 However, the processes and structures set up by the bill have been heavily criticised by 
academics and NGOs working with rural community. They argue that the Act adopts an 
inappropriate paradigm in dealing with the whole issue of legalising land tenure regimes in South 
Africa’s rural areas. Tenure reform has the potential to contribute to a successful land reform but 
unfortunately it has been one of the least success land reform stories South Africa can anchor 
on15. Creating a unitary system of a non-racial formal tenure rights has been one of the most 
daunting exercises DLA has had to grapple with. The Communal Land Rights Act is an attempt 
to respond to this lacuna but the means of doing so have elicited widespread disapproval. 
 
   A Critique of the Communal Land Rights Act 
 
Definition of Community 
 One of the contentious issues facing the CLRA (2004) is that the basis for land rights 
reform is based on the bill’s definition of “community.” The community is defined in terms of 
“shared rules”  as stated in Section 1 of the Act:  
 
                                                             
15 Current estimates from the DLA (2004), is that out of a total of 2.8 million hectares transferred between 1994-
March 2004, land tenure reform (e.g. through ESTA and LTA) has accounted for a meagre 5%. Part of the reason 
for the low transfer is also because some of these legislations such as ESTA deal more with conflict resolution,  
regulating legal contexts that govern evictions, as opposed to an outright transfer of land, though the latter is 
sometimes considered as a recourse. 
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Community means a group or portion of a group of persons whose rights to land are derived 
from shared rules determining access to land held in common by such group. 
 Unfortunately, rural communities in South Africa are a product of the apartheid forced 
removals where people were dumped in areas under the jurisdiction of chiefs who were 
recognised by the government. The de facto rights of theses people do not derive from “shared 
rules”, but from the fact of their established occupation and land use, and from acceptance of 
these by their neighbours. The nested character of most systems of communal land rights, within 
a hierarchy of neighbourhoods, sub-villages, villages, wards and chieftainships makes the 
definition of “community” intrinsically difficult in this respect. For instance , the Act is unclear as 
to what the limits of community boundaries should be (Cousins 2003). The danger in assuming 
that there exist easily identifiable “communities” with “shared rules” is that this works to shore 
up the traditional leaders, whom may or may not enjoy the support of people under their 
jurisdiction (AFRA 2002: 6). This is one of the classical examples of the policy makers inability to 
learn from the experiences of restitution process in South Africa16.  
 Communities who applied to the Restitution Commission for the restoration of their lost 
land rights to a piece of land soon realised that different factions within their communit y paid 
homage to different tribal lineages. The Restitution Commission encountered a number of 
challenges in settling rural claims. For instance, most of the land in the ex-homeland areas is 
unregistered and un-surveyed, and thus there are no titles or maps. This makes archival research 
very difficult. As a result, family and community disputes are often difficult to resolve in cases 
where multiple claims are made within one community. This delays the process of restitution and 
impacts negatively on community cohesion. In cases where restoration of rights was accorded 
statutory recognition, the process of socio-economic development was never realised. Rights 
without ensuing development do not improve the livelihoods of the beneficiary communities. 
Restitution process was based on the understanding that there exists a discernable community 
marked by a common concern for land to be shared by all within a particular group. Questions of 
power dynamics and vested groups were rarely considered in conceiving the target group of the 
policy. Similarly, the Communal Land Rights Act assumes a similar position in its understanding 
of what constitutes a community17. 
                                                             
16 See Du Toit (2000: 75-91) for a full account of the difficulties that impede the restitution process i n South Africa 
17 Kepe’s (1998) work on “The Problem of Defining Community: Challenges for The Land Reform” elaborates on 
this ambiguity. It looks at varied conceptions of community- spatially defined with a focus on spatial units, i.e., 
people who share a common locality, and but often enough they are conflicting notions of who belongs to which 
group or economically defined in economic terms where different groups share common interests, control particular 
resources or share similar economic activities to make a living. However the question of “belonging” in a community 
is often a vexed one. 
 16 
 In rural South Africa, the genesis of this problem lies in the historical legacy of the 
apartheid system. Most rural communities were essentially "invented" through social engineering. 
Due to the legacy of forced removals, dumping and jurisdictional controls, rights were derived 
from occupation and use as opposed to membership of a community based on shared values. 
Due to social engineering, land rights in such cases tend to conflict and overlap with those of 
other members who were physically relocated to the same jurisdiction. In essence, the Act deals 
with community members or beneficiaries as though they are empty of history18 rather than 
people caught up and living in existing social processes and structures that make day-to-day 
activities possible and meaningful (PLAAS/NLC 2003). Despite this shortcoming, the CLRA 
vests ownership in “communities” and yet community members do not have adequate leverage 
to determine the composition, and management of the new CLRA structures.19   
  
Gender Inequality and Traditional Councils 
 The institutions set up by the Act will undermine the attainment of gender equality – one 
of the constitutional rights enshrined in the Bill of rights. Women face serious problems under 
communal tenure. Under customary law, only men are allocated land. Women can generally 
access use rights to land via relationships with men (PLAAS/NLC 2003). The unequal and 
discriminatory nature of women’s access to land under customary law has been re-enforced by 
formal law. For example, most common record of land rights in communal areas is through 
Permission to Occupy20 (PTO). Yet PTO regulations provide that they are issued only to men. 
PTOs are an example of an old order right. However, old order rights were highly gendered in 
the allocation of land rights in communal areas21. 
So, if the basis of the Act is to transform these gendered old order rights into new order 
rights, then the inherent gender inequality found in old order rights with respect to property 
relations will merely receive statutory recognition. However, the gendered nature of old order 
rights is recognised in the Act to the extent that, old order rights are deemed to be held by all 
spouses in a marriage, and not by the husband alone. This awareness is reflected in the Act in 
                                                             
18 For more elaboration, see Alcock and Hornby ( 2004: 2) 
19 This refers to the structures set up by the Act namely the Land Administration Committees/Traditional Councils 
and the Land Rights Board that are mandated with the administrative aspects of the Act and the management of 
communal land. The shortcoming of these structures in terms of their terms of reference will be dealt with at a later 
stage in the paper to demonstrate community’s marginality with respect to the operations of these structures. 
20 Permission to Occupy or PTOs as they are commonly termed was the main method of establishing rights under 
the regulations that governed land rights in communal areas. These regulations were the Black Areas Regulations  
R 188 of 1969, which were made under the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 and the Development Trust and 
Land Act of 1936. The National Land Committee noted that by 1997, approximately 32% (12.7 million people or 2.4 
million households) of South Africa's population lived in the former homeland areas with 63.6% having PTO,  
26.8% lacked PTO, and the remaining 9.6% were uncertain whether they had PTOs or not.  
21 This provision has been repealed through the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act No 120 of 1998 but its 
legacy remains in most rural areas. 
 17 
Section 4 (2), and (3) respectively:  
 
An old order right held by a married person is, despite any law, practice, usage or 
registration to the contrary, deemed to be held by all spouses in a marriage in which such 
person is a spouse, jointly in undivided shares irrespective of the matrimonial property 
regime applicable to such marriage and must, on confirmation or conversion in terms of 
Section 18(3), be registered in the names of all such spouses.  
 
A woman is entitled to the same legally secure tenure, rights in or to land and benefits 
from land as is a man, and no law, community or other rule, practic e or usage may 
discriminate against any person on the ground of the gender of such person. 
 
 
Irrespective of the gender awareness reflected in the Act, no explicit provision is made 
for securing the current use and occupation rights of single women (widows or unmarried 
women). Hence given the aforesaid, it will be difficult to create a balance with respect to gender 
inequality especially in areas where traditional authorities have assumed authority of land matters 
within their respective jurisdiction. In terms of its safeguard mechanism in establishing gender 
parity, the Act adopts a technical approach in attaining gender parity. The CLRA states the 
minimum number of women representation required in a Land Rights Board, Land 
Administration Committee, Traditional Council or the criteria the Minister should consider in 
his/ her determination of the land rights conversion. These are spelt out in various sections of the 
Act : 14 (g), 18 (4) (b), 22 (3), and 26 (3) (b). For instance, Section 14 (g) of the Act states that a 
land rights enquiry must in respect of an area enquire into: 
 
The measures required to ensure compliance with section 4 and to promote gender 
equality in the allocation, registration and exercise of new order rights. 
  
 Once the Minister has received a copy of the land rights enquiry, He/ she is supposed to 
determine the nature of the rights conversion within a context that would promote gender 
equali ty. As stipulated in Section 18 (4) (b) the Minister could confer new order rights on a 
woman:  
 
(i) who is a spouse of a male holder of an old order right, to be held jointly 
with her spouse; 
 
(ii) who is the widow of a male holder of an old order right, or who otherwise 
succeeds to such right, to be held solely by such woman; or 
 
(iii) in her own right;  
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 The Act requires that at least a third of the total members of the Land Administration 
Committee must be women22. With relation to the Land Rights Board,  the Act obligates the 
Minister to ensure that at least a third of its board members are women 23. One of the most 
contested aspects of the CLRA is Section 21 (2) . It stipulates that in communities where 
Traditional Councils exist, these organisations may assume the functions and responsibilities of 
the Land Administration Committees. The word ‘may’ is most likely to be contested by 
traditional authorities who would want to automatically assume a responsibility of land 
management in their respective jurisdiction, hence undermining community preference between 
the choice of a Traditional Council and a Land  Administration Committee. 
 Traditional Councils are structures that have been set up through the Traditional 
Leadership and Framework Bill (TLGF) of 2003. They are principally tasked with assisting 
traditional communities on area s pertaining to their developmental needs, liaising with 
municipalities on these matters, and administering the general affairs of the traditional 
community24. The irony however is, if they are no Traditional Councils in a particular jurisdiction, 
then Local Land Administration Committees will execute their functions. However, no 
traditional leaders are supposed to be included as part of this committee25. This could be 
contested in a minority of cases where community members are willing to have a member from 
the traditional authority in their LAC structures. It denies communities a wide range of choice in 
selecting their land administrators based on the particularities of their social environment.  
 Another limitation of the Act as far as the administration of the Communal Land Rights 
Act is concerned, is that Traditional Councils, as mandated by the Traditional Council and 
Governance Framework Bill26 (TLGF), are supposed to have not more than 30 members. A third 
of their members must be women. Members of the Traditional Council must comprise of senior 
traditional leaders and members of traditional communities who must be nominated by senior 
traditional leaders. Only a paltry 40% of its membership must be elected. In cases where it has to 
execute the functions of a Land Administration Committee, a Traditional Council must ensure 
that the composition of its membership satisfies the key requirements of the Land 
Administration Committee. These include having representative members from: Land Affairs, 
Land Rights Board, Agriculture, Local Government and Municipality. In essence this is an 
                                                             
22 Section 22 (3) elaborates on this issue 
23 Section 26 (3)(b) elaborates on this point  
24 Section 4 of the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Bill elaborates further on the functions of the    
Traditional Council. These functions and responsibilities are subject to customary law and practice and most critics 
are skeptical whether these structures will be gender sensitive in executing their role in traditional community.  
25Section 22(2) of the CLRA, excludes the membership of any traditional leader in the Land Administrative 
Committees.  
26 Section 3 of the TLGF Bill outlines in detail the required composition of its members 
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additional layer of people over and above the normative composition of a Traditional Council 
stipulated by the TLGF27.  
 It is evident from the composition of the Traditional Councils and Local Administrative 
Committees that women representation will be a minority, let alone challenging the leverage a 
membership of 30% can hold in effectively impacting decision making processes of these 
structures. The 30% composition is more likely to be made up of those members selected by 
senior traditional leaders within the council as required by the TLGF Bill than those who will hail 
from the elected officialdom (40%). If this holds, then it would be difficult for the nominated 
women into the council to wield an independent assertive voice that would differ from the 
“official” position, values or status quo of the traditional council members who nominated them 
into the council.  
 Without an explicit recognition of how skewed power relations structure access to and 
control ove r land in rural areas, it is unlikely that broad policy commitments such as the 
‘numerical minimums’ set for women representation will have any impact in addressing gender 
inequality. Given these structural processes the CLRA sets in motion, it is likely that women may 
qualify for secondary rights even under the new tenure reforms proposed by the Act, especially in 
areas where Traditional  Councils have assumed full responsibility of land management. The right 
to equality and protection from discrimination on the basis of gender28 may be compromised as a 
result.  
 The institutionalisation of Traditional Councils will entrench unequal power relations in 
the rural areas, or using Mamdani’s (1996) characterization of traditional authorities, will further 
consolidate their “clenched fist”29 that traditional authorities have had in colonial and post-
colonial Africa. This is because, as unelected structures, their generic base of power i.e. land 
allocation and management remains intact . This puts prospects for democratic decentralisation of 
rural local governance at a bleak future.  
 Given the fact that Traditional Councils are mandated to execute the functions of the 
Land Administrative Committees where they exist, the effectiveness of these councils will not 
only be defined by the appropriateness of the CLRA but rather by the institutional support and 
applicability of the TLGF Bill within a given jurisdiction. In essence the success of the CLRA is 
                                                             
27 ibid. 
28 This right is enshrine d in section 9 of South Africa’s Constitution. 
29 Mamdani’s thesis is that traditional authorities are a construct of colonialism, and yet post-colonial states have not 
abolished these structures as part of their democratisation agenda. Traditional authorities exercised “decentralised 
despotism” which kept rural people ethnically divided, which they achieved from the fusion of various 
powers/responsibilities: judicial administrative, legislative and executive exemplified in his metaphor of “clenched 
fist”. The inability of post-colonial states to dismantle this institution has stalled the democratic process, and 
consolidated the rural-urban divide and ethnic pluralism that has marked most post-colonial states. 
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contingent on the success of the TLGF bill. The essence of the TLGF Bill is merely to provide 
for the formal recognition of traditional communities, and to provide for the establishment and 
recognition of traditional councils that would conduct the affairs of its subjects in accordance to 
customary law and practice30. Given this statutory role defined for Traditional Councils, it is 
therefore imperative that the aims of the TLGF bill are realised with minimum conflicts  or 
resistance at the local level if the expected functions of the Traditional Councils as defined by the 
CLRA is to be effective at the local level.  
 The criticism levelled at the CLRA with respect to traditional authority structures is 
symptomatic of the national paradox that characterise South Africa’s fledgling democracy. On the 
one hand, South Africa’s liberal democracy boasts an impeccable attempt to uphold civic and 
political liberties while on the other, a wide range of political and social imperatives have 
compelled the government to accord constitutional credence to tribal authorities31. The latter is 
viewed as anti-modern and unable to uphold the virtues of a modern liberal democratic model 
enshrined in South Africa’s constitution, which commits itself to a representative, accountable 
and democratic mode of governance. Traditional authorities that exist in South Africa today 
function on the principle of hereditary rule institutionalized by previous regimes. This  means 
that elected representatives of local governments have to contend with the presence and powers 
of non-elected traditional authorities whose functions, recognition and powers, have been 
defined in the constitution, the White Paper on Local Government, Traditional Leadership and 
Governance Framework Bill, and the Communal Land Rights Act.32 One of the major challenges 
facing the Communal Land Rights Act is rooted in this ‘legislative dialectic’ that accords 
competing and overlapping functions around land management matters between elected 
representatives and unelected representatives at the local government level.  
 The other contradiction implicit in according this dual acknowledgment of representative 
and unrepresentative mode of governance at the sub -national level, is that it undermines gender 
                                                             
30 Section 4 of TLGF Bill provides an elaborate role of Traditional Councils. For instance, the Bill defines the role of 
traditional leaders in municipalities and also provides for the establishment of the Commission on Traditional 
Leadership, Disputes and Claims resolution. The role for traditional leadership, is also extended beyond local 
government to include provincial and national government. 
31 Ntsebeza (2004: 23) gives an account of why the ANC has conceded to the concerns of Traditional Authorities 
despite their chequered past. Within the ANC, there are pro-and-anti-chiefs factions. For instance, former President 
Nelson Mandela is a pro-chief, while the late Govan Mbeki, the father of President Thabo Mbeki, was a strong critic 
of chieftainship. It seems that the pro-chief lobby has always pushed for their interests, partly because traditional 
leaders are seen as important institutions to garner rural votes, since they are seen as legitimate and popular. The 
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) has always pushed for the constitutional acknowledgement of traditional leadership in 
the constitution. Threats by IFP to boycott the 1994 elections if traditional authorities were not given constitutional 
acknowledgement is a case in point. The weak existence of rural civil society to agitate against unpopular traditional  
leaders has also created a “monopoly” of negotiation on the part of traditional leaders, as a key interest group in rural 
South Africa, as exemplified in the role CONTRALESA plays in advancing their interests. 
32 See Rangan and Gilmartin (2002: 639); Ntsebeza (2004: 14-19); and the 1996 South African Constitution on the 
Bill of Rights and Local Government. 
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equity rights enshrined in South Africa’s constitution. The endorsement of traditional authorities 
w ithin the constitution and the other legislative documents implies that customary law and 
practice which is often associated with patriarchal practices, will not uphold gender equity 
concerns as reviewed earlier in the paper. Customary law and practice offe rs few formal means 
through which women’s independent needs or claims to land can be addressed (Rangan and 
Gilmartin, 2002: 639).    
 Comparative insight from Kenya’s attempt with her titling strategy in the pre-independent 
period(1955) as part of the Swynnerton programme33 which continued in the post-independence 
period (1963) proved to be a failure in so far as protecting the rights of women was concerned. 
This is because the statutory registration of title did not replace customary law. Rather, customary 
and statutory strategies were used in tandem to secure rights to land and control the disposal of 
land at inheritance. As land become scarce, the claims of lineages were asserted to keep or 
recover control of land. The recreation of components of customary law led patrilineal groups to 
exclude women’s claims to land lest this lead them to lose land to others (William and Francis 
1993; Gertzel 1970). This explains why women accounted for less than five per cent of the total 
registered landholders. Those who gained were heads of households, who in many communities 
were adult males (Kibwana 1990).  
   
Constitutional Concerns of CLRA 
 The Communal Land Rights Act also raises  constitutional concerns given the wide 
discretionary powers vested in the Minister as the sole determinant of how the conversion of 
land rights will be undertaken based on the report of the land rights enquiry process34. This is 
viewed as unconstitutional in the sense that Section 25 (6) of the constitution provides: 
 
A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either 
to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress. 
                                                             
33 The 1954 Swynnerton Plan aimed at transforming customary land rights to individual freehold. The twin pillars of 
the programme was the institution of freehold land tenure and the selective loosening of restrictions on African 
cultivation of high value crops such as coffee and tea. Transforming customary land rights to freehold land tenure 
was achieved through the process of adjudication, consolidation and registration. It was hoped that creating a landed 
gentry would act as a bulwark against the anti-colonial revolt that had emerged during the MAU MAU revolt in the 
early 1950s. 
34 Section 18 (1) of CLRA states:  If the Minister, having received a report by a land rights enquirer, is satisfied that 
the requirements of this Act have been met, he or she must, subject to subsections (4) and (5) and having regard to:  
(a) such report; (b) all relevant law, including customary law and law governing spatial planning, local government and 
agriculture; (c) the old order rights of all affected right holders; (d) the need to provide access to land on an equitable 
basis; and (e) the need to promote gender equality in respect of land make a determination as contemplated in 
subsections (2) and (3). Section 18 (2) states: The Minister must, where applicable, determine the location and extent 
of the land to be transferred to a community or person.  
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 The Act does not offer an upfront right or entitlement to secure tenure or comparable 
redress. Instead the minister is vested with wide discretionary powers to provide secure tenure or 
redress. This is in contrast to other land reform legislation, such as Restitution of Land Rights 
Act 22 of 1994 and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA), which provide 
for the entitlement of the right.  Through these Acts35, to secure one’s rights was an entitlement 
and did not depend on a Ministerial discretion. With the Communal Land Rights Act, the 
determination of the extent of the right to be secured or comparable redress to be accorded is left 
to the Minister to decide. The unco nstitutionality of this is based on the fact that the constitution 
states, “an Act of Parliament” as specified in section 25 (6) of the constitution and not the 
Minister should give effect to the rights and determine the nature and extent.  Such unlimited 
powers could be open to abuse or are simply viewed at dissonance with constitutional principles. 
The Act seeks to transform constitutionally guaranteed rights into a discretionary benefit based 
on a Ministerial decision36.  
Community participation in the land rights enquiry is partially protected by the Act37, 
since majority decisions regarding land tenure will inform the basis of the land rights enquiry 
report. However, there is no requirement that majority consent is necessary for the decision to 
transfer title, or when a Land Administration Committee is established, or prior to the Minister 
reserving part of communal land for state use38. The Act 39 outlines general issues to be included 
in a land rights enquiry such as nature of old order rights, conflicting rights, interests of the state, 
options available for legally securing any insecure rights, comparable redress, equity issues, gender 
issues and spatial planning requirements. Such open-ended factors are bound to be interpreted 
differently by officials concerned in this process, hence introducing inconsistencies in decision-
making . Critics40 of the Act claim that one of the reasons why the bill has taken such a unilateral 
approach with respect to the land rights enquiry process and the determination thereof, is due to 
the fact that the drafters are aware of the inexorable nature of the disputes concerning 
                                                             
35 These Acts refer to some of the land reform tenure legislations the Government set up in post-1994 as measures 
to protect the vulnerable farm workers/labour tenants/people residing on land without recognised statutory rights. 
36 This aspect of the Act was emphatically stated in the submissions made by the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU), National Union of Mine Workers (NUM), The Legal Resource Centre (LRC) and National Land 
Committee and Programme for Land and Agrarian Programme (NLC/PLAAS). 
37 Section 17 (2) states: A land rights enquirer must adopt measures to ensure that decisions made by a community 
are in general the informed and democratic decisions of the majority of the members of such community who are 18 
years of age or older and are present or represented by a proxy at a community meeting of which adequate notice of 
not less than21 days was given.  
38 See Cousins, 2004. p. 5 
39 Section 14 (2) of the Communal Land Rights Act elaborates on these issues  
40 For instance the Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies/National Land Committee, 2003 submissions were 
quite vocal in expressing the unilateral nature of the decision making process enshrined in the Act. Similar views 
were expressed by other NGOs such as the Legal Resource Centre (LRC) and the South African Council of 
Churches (SACC).  
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boundaries, identity and power that land transfers would elicit. In this regard, it seems the 
principle of a majority consensus will be used in shaping the recommendations made through the 
land right enquiry process.  
  
Institutional Capacity to Implement CLRA 
 The institutions required for the Act to function effectively are beyond the current 
capacity government, civil society and communities are able to marshal for its effective 
implementation. Institutional incapacity especially at the third tier of Government i.e. Local 
Government has proven to be one of the weakest points of development delivery in South Africa 
and yet these are some of the closest contact points the government has with its constituency. 
This is often exacerbated by the three tier system of governance defined in Chapter 3 of the 
Constitution which mandates the central, provincial and local government to engage with each 
other in a cooperative governance mode on issues pertaining to development. This often raises a 
whole range of complexities especially with government agencies that suffer from acute 
manpower shortages. For instance, the composition of the Land Rights Board, Land 
Administrative Committees, and  Traditional Councils are supposed to have representatives from 
different organs of the state. It is expected that useful developmental synergies will be gained if 
line departments such as local government, municipalities, and agriculture, work in cohort in 
these structures. Unfortunately, the dismal lack of post-transfer support and development with 
past redistribution and restitution projects was precisely because this kind of vertical and 
horizontal institutional coordination was never achieved between government agencies as 
stipulated in the policy41.  
 The inclusion of new structures such as the Land Rights Board  and Land Administration 
Committees will further complicate the “institutional matrix” that is supposed to enforce the 
delivery of policy. The challenge is that Traditional Councils or Land Administrative Committees 
will constitute a new tier of government with heavy developmental and public land administrative 
functions and powers. In principle the provincial government, municipalities, provincial 
agriculture department, industrial and economic sector representatives are required to occupy the 
different structures established by the Act such as the Land Administrative Committees, 
Traditional Councils and the Land Rights Board. It is assumed these different structures will 
work in cohort in the realisation of the objectives of the Act.  
                                                             
41 Elsewhere in the author’s work (Kariuki 2004) he has compared two models of land redistribution projects 
between 1997 -1999 and between 2000 -2004, and came to the conclusion that both models of land reform projects 
have failed precisely because the expected post -transfer support required by community beneficiaries was not 
forthcoming from the government agencies tasked with this responsibility. Post-transfer support services is a multi-
sectoral government process which is often hindered by the weak institutional structures and limited resources 
required to carry out the process.  
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 The challenge here is the extent to which this Act may conflate its developmental vision 
with those of the local government agencies in the respective jurisdiction affected by the Act. 
Local Government are supposed to provide developmental services to their local communities. 42 
In the past, municipal services were usually delivered up to the boundary of a private 
landholding 43. Often enough, the local authority that effect improvements of land for the 
purposes of services would want to own the land on which the improvements are made. The 
extent to which municipalities will be willing to accord services to land which it does not own is 
yet to be seen in this case because the CLRA accords municipalities unequivocal powers to 
initiate development within the communal areas irrespective of any labyrinth of laws that may 
possibly hamper rapid development of communal areas from taking place44.  
 Hence, the CLRA is bound to fall prey to these kinds of institutional dynamics. The Act 
is premised on a flawed as sumption that South Africa has an advanced and well resourced land 
administration system capable of implementing these complex reforms envisaged in the 
communal areas. Despite institutional weakness that is bound to stifle the success of the Act, 
costs implications are bound to be even of a greater challenge. To provide support services in the 
areas of land administration, land management, rights enquiries, and the provision of alternative 
land or comparable redress will have far-reaching resource implications. Recent estimates by the 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA) suggest that that this will cost at least R 1 billion a year , over 
five years, equivalent to over 70% of its current budget for all aspects of land reform45. An actual 
breakdown of the costs of implementation is unavailable and the DLA is currently 
commissioning work on systems and procedures for implementing the Act. It is therefore likely 
that the implementation of the Act will only begin in 2005 46. 
 Beyond the cost factor, for tenure reform to become a reality on the ground, rights 
holders need information on their rights and access to a wide range of support systems at local, 
district, provincial and national level. They will require ready access to government officials or 
non-governmental agencies to assist them in the administration of their land, dispute resolution, 
and maintaining records of rights holders. Monitoring of decision making by dedicated officials is 
vital, to ensure that rights are respected and community administrative structures do enjoy the 
support of a majority of rights holders (AFRA 2002: 8). Safeguard mechanism against possible 
                                                             
42 This is clearly stated in section 152 of the constitution which states that one of the objectives of local government 
is to ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner 
43 In section 37 of the communal Land Rights Act, this acknowledgement is indirectly alluded to when it notes that 
no law must prohibit a municipality from providing services and development infrastructure on communal land 
however held or owned 
44 This is elaborated in Section 37 of the Communal Land Rights Act.   
45 See Hall and Lahiff, 2004, p. 3 
46 See Cousins 2004, p. 1 
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abuse of power within the CLRA is partially recognised. For example CLRA explicitly state that 
any decision by the Land Administration Committee to dispose the land must be ratified by the 
respective Land Rights Board within its jurisdictional control47. Given this challenge, what has 
been the institutional experience of implementing previous tenure legislations such as: ESTA, 
LTA, and CPAs in South Africa?  
  
Tenure Reform Experience in South Africa 
 Capacity shortage at government level, coupled with a dismal lack of land rights 
awareness among rural communities has encumbered the success of previous land tenure reform 
legislations in South Africa. For instance, the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA ) was 
meant to provide for long-term security of tenure to farm occupiers, regulate the terms that 
should govern eviction process, and where necessary provide alternative land to the affected 
people. As noted earlier in the paper (see p. 8-9),  this Act relied on institutions that are at worst 
were hostile to ESTA such as the magistrates and police, which are inadequately resourced to 
enforce these procedural rights. Rights awareness within the communities threatened with 
eviction was low and in most cases community members did not know where to seek legal advice 
or support with respect to their demands.  
 Government’s inability to invoke its power enshrined in some of these legislations is 
evident. For example, Section 26 of the ESTA Act gives the Minister powers to expropriate land  
for purposes of development for the affected communities. These clauses create a perception 
that farm occupiers will get secure tenure from the legislation, but the reality has been very 
different. Since its inception in 1997, this section of the Act has not been used48. Coupled with 
low levels of land rights awareness by the community and the sheer lack of institutions to 
represent the vulnerable labor tenants and farm occup iers, their precarious state, and threats of 
evictions continue unabated within a context of weak rights enforcements. For instance, the only 
ironical achievement of ESTA is that it has established a legal framework for regulat ing farm 
evictions, without any inbuilt developmental component into the process to support farm 
dwellers legally evicted from farms.  
 On the other hand, the Communal Property Associations Act of 1996 established a legal 
framework for communal ownership of land. However, the majority of Communal Property 
Associations established since then, have subsequently collapsed, sometimes due to financial 
problems, but more often owing to insufficient attention being paid to the tenure arrangements 
                                                             
47 Section 24 (2) of CLRA elaborates on this issue 
48 Nkuzi Development Association (2003: 2) For more details on this account, see, Submission to the Portfolio 
Committee for Land and Agriculture.  
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encompassed by such associations.  Group titles have been issued to over 500 Communal 
Property Associations (CPAs) and community trusts since 1996, but many of these are now 
dysfunctional. Constitutions were poorly drafted and misunderstood by members, and rights of 
individual members were poorly defined. These inadequacies have resulted in endemic infighting. 
In some cases, traditional leaders have contested the authority of elected trustees. In others, elites 
have captured the benefits of ownership. The cause of these problems is not the fact that CPAs 
are a form of shared land holding. Most people desire a system of group tenure. This system has 
proved resilient and persistent in Africa and elsewhere but rather the support provided to these 
groups by government, both in the initial stages of establishment and subsequently, has been 
completely inadequate (Cousin 2002). The committees of these associations were not capable of 
compiling and maintaining records of land tenure rights. In cases where CPA were weak, they 
were often subsumed under by the stronger local government structures. In fact, most of the 
CPAs were seen to double as surrogate local authorities49. The experience with CPAs in South 
Africa demonstrates the inherent difficulties of creating legal entities to manage land communally 
without attending to the question of institutional capability and their appropriateness to the social 
environment. In essence CPA combined strong procedural rights50 with weak substantive rights51.   
 The irony here is that the CLRA envisages that the Land Administration Committees that 
are established based on the same constitutional principles as those of the CPAs should now be 
capable of maintaining records and allocating new order rights52. Land Administration 
Committees under the CLRA are given complex and difficult functions to perform, yet they are 
comprised of unpaid community members who will most probably lack the capacity to undertake 
these tasks on their own53. Existing tensions between land administrations, and local institutions 
(such as municipality) will be inevitable given the far reaching management powers these 
committees are accorded by the CLRA. Experience from Kenya also attests to the difficulties 




                                                             
49 See Williams (2003: 5) for a fuller elaboration on this concept. 
50 Cousins and Hornby (2003: 135), define procedural rights as rights relating to the governance of the common 
property. These include rights to: attend, speak and vote at meetings, be elected to an official position, rights defining 
recourse for dispute settlement, fair and equal treatment and information about the management of the common 
property. 
51 Ibid., Substantive rights refer to the content of land tenure rights. These would include rights of access to and use 
of different areas of  land, rights of access to and use of different resources on the land, group mineral rights and 
rights around benefits that flow from property ownership e.g. profit-sharing 
52 ibid. 
53 See Cousins and Claassens (2003: 71) 
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Kenya’s Experience with the Group Ranch Concept 
 The concept of collective rights within a statutory context was achieved with the 
pastoralists’ tribes in Kenya through the Group Ranch concept54. The registration of group 
ranches was viewed as a compromise between individual ownership and the need for access to 
wider resources in dry lands. Under this system, “communal lands” are divided into smaller units 
(ranches) which are then registered in the names of group representatives (three to ten members) 
elected by the members of the group. Every member of the group has rights in the ownership of 
the group land in undivided shares (Mugabe and Ogolla; 1996:98-99; Okoth-Ogendo 1998; 
Rutten 1992: 474). 
 The administration of the group registration areas accentuated problems of conflict and 
accountability during the implementation process. This is because the authority of the land was 
exercised through the group representatives. Although the Land Act was fairly general about who 
may hold office as a group representative, the emerging practice appeared to be that those elected 
to office were people who were at least able to read and write. Those assuming office tended to 
be younger and less influential members of indigenous society. This tended to slow down 
decision-making in many areas, since most decisions taken by the representatives still carried very 
little weight unless they were also channelled through indigenous levels of authority (Okoth-
Ogendo 1998) and more so, most of the group ranch committees were accused of corruption, 
they mostly allocated land to themselves and friends above average sized ranches (Rutten 1997: 
80). In total they were about 17 agencies whose operations had an impact on the group ranch in 
one way or the other. There was a serious lack of co -ordination between the several institutions 
involved in the group ranch project (Rutten 1992: 286). In essence the Group Ranch concept as 
proposed by outsiders was an artificial creation which lacked a firm traditional, sociological , as 
well as an ecological basis (Rutten 1992: 475).  
 Based on the Kenyan experience, the South African experience with the CLRA is bound 
to be a challenging one. The Land Administrative Committees and Land Rights Board under the 
CLRA are bound to face similar problems experienced with the Group Ranch concept in Kenya 
– leadership problems and community conflicts are bound to impact on the functioning of the 
CLRA structures. For instance, the Land Administrative Committees are tasked with the 
allocation of new order rights, managing the records of new order rights, creating cooperation 
within community and playing a conflict resolution role within the community.  These are 
mammoth tasks which they are not remunerated to do, but rather work on a voluntary basis.  
                                                             
54 The Group Ranch concept was  established through the Land (Group Representatives) Act  Cap. 287 of 1968 in 
Kenya (cited in Mugabe and Ogolla 1996: 98-99) 
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CLRA Approach to Land Tenure Model 
The Communal Land Rights Act (2004) has been criticized in its paradigmatic approach 
to tenure models. The CLRA ascribes to the desirability of according statutory recognition to 
communal/indigenous land rights as part of their modernization project.  It is viewed as an 
‘ideological captive’ of antiquated debates that have raged on about the best tenure regimes to 
have for agricultural development.55The debate on the effectiveness and appropriateness of 
communal rights vis-à-vis freehold tenure has confronted many social scientists (Okth-Ogendo 
1998, Kanyinga 2000) in Africa during the colonial and post-colonial epoch.  
At the epicentre of the debate is an old ideological inclination that freehold tenure, whose 
origin lies in Western jurisprudence, is seen as more conducive to agricultural development than 
communal tenure systems, which are seen as anti-modernist to economic development. This kind 
of dualistic analysis where one form of tenure regime was juxtaposed against the other failed to 
recognise that communal tenure arrangements could be as effective as freehold tenure 
arrangements which could actually co-exist with one another within a formalised legal 
arrangement. However, other scholars (Okoth-Ogendo 1998; Migot-Adholla et al. 1994; Ondiege 
1996) note that indigenous tenure systems were not as static as western-based conceptions of 
African property systems had made them appear. They believed that there was always a 
spontaneous individualization of land rights over time, which allowed families to acquire a 
broader and more powerful set of transfer, and exclusion rights over their land as population 
pressure and agricultural commercialization proceeded. These differing views dominated the 
debate on the efficacy and superior status gained from western-style freehold property systems as 
opposed to  indigenous property systems found in African communities. This narrow view of 
tenure reform obscures opportunities for reforms which strengthen the land rights of local 
people and ensure that their land cannot be alienated or otherwise used without their consent by  
government, developers or other third parties (Adams et. 2000: 112). The CLRA succinctly 
reflects on these debates, through its attempt to transform communal land systems to freehold  
systems.  
 
Did Kenya Achieve Agricultural Productivity through the Titling Strategy? 
 As we have noted earlier, South Africa’s CLRA is premised on a failed hypothesis other 
African countries have attempted  (e.g. Kenya) which tends to  link  freehold tenure with increased 
investment and production. This link is not as axiomatic as often perceived. There are multiple 
                                                             
55 In this debate, one of the commonly cited titling strategy is The Swynnerton Plan initiated in 1954 in Kenya aimed 
at introducing freehold rights.  
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factors that define the success of farming; land titling is only one of them. However , comparative 
analysis warns us that formalising tenure regime is not a guarantee to improved productivity. The 
debate on tenure seems to be couched in a technicist mould in the sense that productivity and 
efficiency within the black agro-sector is taken to be a normative output of freehold tenure 
arrangements. Without restructuring the agro-support services such as rural agricultural market, 
access to credit, extension services etc, the envisioned productivity and efficiency hypothesis is 
bound to fail.   
 The Kenyan tenure individualization reform56 has been the subject of radically different 
evaluations. Land tenure reform in the Native Reserves under the Swynnerton Plan gave rise to 
unique but related sets of problems regarding access and control of land thereby laying the basis 
for a rather complex and unresolved land question57. In terms of p urely economic indicators, land 
tenure reform in Kenya was viewed to have led to the overall increase in productivity in 1960s, 
1970s and early 1980s among the African middle class and peasantry - mainly the result of the 
lifting of colonial legal restrict ions on access to land, growing of cash crops and access to 
agricultural inputs (Gutto 1995: 38-39). For instance, as a result of tenure reforms, there has been 
a marked improvement in land-use and environmental management in many areas after 
registration.  A notable example in both Central and Western provinces is the development of 
agro-forestry both for commercial and domestic purposes. There was an increase of tree planting 
after the registration process was complete. This was partly due to the fact that land registration 
eliminated communal sources of wood and therefore forced landholders to develop individual 
sources (Mugabe and Ogolla 1996:103-104). 
 Some have argued that agricultural production may have increased due to the transition, 
in some cases by force, from pastoralism to intensive agriculture. For instance, in Machakos 
district, a colonial de-stocking  campaign pushed the Akamba into intensive agricultural 
production. The massive de-stocking that was forcefully undertaken as part of the colonial 
conservation campaign marked the irreversible change in land use from that of agro-pastoralism 
to agriculture. However, the agricultural boost that was experienced from 1960s-1980s was 
heavily debated as to whether the emergence of freehold tenure was solely responsible for the 
boom (Ondiege 1996). For some, the great transformation of Kenyan agriculture was not 
brought by changes in the legal status of rights to land. At best, it could be argued that 
                                                             
56 Due to its expansive scope, the wider politics associated with land reform in post -independent Kenya and the 
impact of land reform programmes su ch as the Million Acre Scheme are not considered in this paper. The value of 
Kenya’s comparative insight with its titling strategy is to illuminate on the problems associated with replacing 
indigenous land rights with individual freehold rights and the ideological basis underpinning this mode of 
replacement paradigm. The social political aspects of land, and its wider impact on national politics is beyond the 
scope of this paper to discuss but the author does acknowledge this limitation.  
57 For more details on this, see Kanyinga, 1998.  
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registration of title has not in itself prevented agricultural growth, perhaps in part because people 
have circumvented its rules. The boom in smallholder farming was made possible by a 
combination of circumstances. International capital became increasingly important in the political 
economy of Kenya, and the influence of European settlers declined. This facilitated inflows of 
investment in transport, processing, and marketing and was associated with new patterns of class 
formation and emergent class alliances, which underpinned the land question at independence. 
Buoyant external and internal markets encouraged the expansion of agricultural production and 
industrial investment (William and Francis 1993:390-391).  
 Empirical evidence from rain-fed farming areas in sub -Saharan Africa (Ghana, Rwanda 
and Kenya) shows that traditional African tenure systems have been flexible and responsive to 
changing economic conditions. For instance where population pressure and commercialisation 
have increased, these systems have evolved from communal rights to systems of individual rights. 
For example, by 1930 in Machakos, customary tenure already recognised private rights, 
particularly in cultivated land (Migot Adholla et al.  1994). Further analysis by Migot-Adholla’s and  
Bruce’s (1994) incisive work challenges the very foundatio n of the land titling programmes, 
concluding that the effects of indigenous tenure institutions, through their impact on land rights, 
do not appear to constrain agricultural productivity. It was likely that farmers felt more secure in 
their ability to cult ivate their land continuously, regardless of the type of rights they had. They 
concluded that there is a very weak relationship between individualisation of land rights and 
agricultural yields in the regions they studied in Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda.  
 Clearly there is little consensus among scholars on the impact of individualised land 
tenure on productivity in Kenya. Conclusions tend to vary depending on the period of analysis. 
For instance, between 1960 and the early 1970s production rose at a high rate which some 
scholars have attributed to land reform. In the highlands and high-density settlement schemes, 
small scale farmers realized higher yields than those in the low -density, large scale farms. In the 
1980s and 1990s, production levels have failed to match increases in population due in part to 
land tenure problems such as continuous uneconomic land subdivisions and poor agricultural 
and land use policies (Ondiege 1996:126). The decline in agricultural production which was 
experienced in the late 1980s and 1990s was partly due to political instability, lack of 
redistributive strategies and the connected phenomenon of official corruption (Gutto 1995). 
Overall, the titling reforms led to more problems than those it aimed to solve. It generated more 
disputes over landownership and resulted in a more skewed distribution of land. It also produced 
and re-inforced ethnic-based interests in land, and made the land question more complex than 
ever. The post-independence government simply retained the colonial land laws and pursued the 
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same land reform objectives without any major alterations. The land policy did not change in 
spite of the complex issues that developed around it, and despite the fact that the government, 
after independence, identified landlessness as a major constraint to the national goal of self -
sufficiency in food. The debate on the efficacy of individual titling was driven more by 
“economic reductionism” that tended to link individual tenure as a key prerequisite to agricultural 
modernisation58. This approach ignores the wider social and political contexts that shape access 
to land and the inherent and often resilient power relations that define property relations within 
communal land systems. 
 Given the above analysis, it is evident that South Africa’s CLRA will most likely not 
achieve its full objectives. Based on some interviews the author conducted in April 2004 for a 
Land Reform Programme in South Africa (The Land Redistribution for Agricultural 
development59, LRAD), interviewees were quick to  mention the CLRA as a greater challenge they 
were going to face once implementation of the Act commenced. For instance, a senior member 
of Land Affairs, made it evident that officials within the Land Affairs are skeptical about the 
success of the Act: 
 
I do not believe in the communal land rights Act. I do not believe that is the 
development path one has to take but never the less I am going to implement it because 
that is my job. We are going to face many problems in implementing this policy. In rural 
communities, you have people who support the chief and those who do not support the 
chief, we anticipate these problems. Why don’t you upgrade existing rights, do we really 
need new rights. If the chief is told he cannot administer land, it is going to be a problem. 
The chief will think his powers are been taken away. The administrative aspects of this 
Act are going to be insurmountable. It seems we have not applied our minds carefully; we 
have just copied a model. Our DLA personnel are yet to develop systems to implement 
the Act. Shakespeare is in charge of looking at the institutional structures required to 
drive this process. Ounce logistics and budgets are in place, then the implementation will 
begin (Interview with Mampho Malgas, Deputy Director, Lowveld Regio n, Provincial 
Department of Land Affairs, 18/04/2004). 
 
From the above quote, it is most likely that Provincial Offices of DLA do not seem to 
have been involved in the drafting of this Act, reflecting on the national competency status of 
land reform policy-making role currently vested with the National Department of Land Affairs, 
Pretoria Office. A director of a local NGO working in Mpumalanga Province had this to say with 
respect to the Act: 
 
                                                             
58 Kanyinga’s (2000) study, “Re-Distribution from Above, The Politics of Land Rights and Squatting in Coastal 
Kenya” provides a clear account of these debates. 
59 This programme (LRAD) was initiated in 2000 and its key aim is to generate a stratum of black commercial 
farmers in South Africa.  
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The provincial leadership will face serious challenges with resp ect to this new Act. They 
don’t have a clue about it and they were not even aware that there was this Act, they were 
never work-shopped on it, they don’t know the implications. Recently I addressed some 
councillors and I asked them if they know this Act and they said no, they did not know 
the implications of the Act and yet it will impact on their administrative responsibilities. 
The councillors felt they were sold out (Interview with Chris Williams, Director, the 
Transvaal Rural Action Committee, Mpumalanga, 19/04/2004). 
 
Similarly, the above assertion reflects the non-participatory character that marked the 
drafting of the Act. Different tiers of Government are unaware about the Act and its implications 
and this is bound to create problems during its implementation. This is despite the fact that for 
the last ten years, land reform experience has proven that developing policies without reforming 
or capacitating existing institutions tasked with implementation will be a flawed effort.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper has reviewed the historical basis of South Africa’s Tenure Reform and its 
legislative genealogy. It argued that Tenure Reform in South Africa is one of the thorniest issues 
the Land Reform Policy is yet to grapple with. The drafting of the tenure reform legislation has 
been a protracted process partly reflecting the complexity of tenure problems in rural South 
Africa. Insecure tenure rights afflict around 13% of South Africa’s rural population estimated at 
43 million. The Communal Land Rights Act will therefore affect about 14 million South Africans 
residing in the homelands, some of the worst underdeveloped regions in South Africa, that 
harbour 72% of the total population considered poor. These people hold insecure, conflicting 
and overlapping rights to land, the basis of which are acquired through occupation and not 
through a statutory process. Conflicts abound in these areas due to the messy “tenure matrix” the 
rural poor have to contend with. A poorly drafted tenure policy is therefore bound to exacerbate 
on these historically ingrained underdevelopment problems facing the rural population. 
Unfortunately, the evaluation done on the Act reveals there is limited scope of it 
succeeding. The Act fails to learn from its own institutional experiences with land reform 
implementation process and Kenya’s titling strategy. Aspects of the Act which were 
unconstitutional were elaborated and their implications considered . The Act also lacks a firm 
sociological base in understanding the “rural community” it targets to “develop” but will instead 
end up disenfranchising in the process. Weak institutional structures e.g. ineffective land 
management systems will encumber the implementation of the Act. Intractable conflicts within 
the community will further derail the Act’s success. These problems have also come to define the 
key features of South Africa’s institutional experience with regard to Land Reform 
implementation process in the past decade (1994-2004). It is therefore unlikely that the 
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Department of Land Affairs will be able to process more than one hundred transfers per year. At 
this rate critics (e.g. Cousins, 2002) estimate that it will take 200 years to transfer land to the 
estimated 20 000 rural communities in the ex-homeland areas. The lessons learnt from Kenya’s 
flawed land registration programme seem to have had a minimal effect in informing the current 
orientation adopted in the Communal Land Rights Act. Writing way back in 1976, Okoth 
Ogendo, one of Kenya’s renowned land law experts, noted that Kenya’s registration process will 
only near completion by the year 2050 (1976: 1). The implied assumption is that it will have taken 
100 years (1950 - 2050) for Kenya to complete its registration process. Prospects of achieving this 
is highly questionable given the fact that by 2001, only 6% of the total land area60 in Kenya has so 
far been registered under individual titles. These statistical estimates reflect the bitter gap that 
exists between the rhetoric of land reform policies in Kenya and South Africa, and the structured 
land inequality patterns these policies aim to restructure. Subsequently, these programmes will 
continue to generate a normative and curious paradox and a milieu for the academy to 
continuously pursue albeit with little success in debunking the paradox of land reforms: why do 
they perpetually fail in contexts of stable liberal democracies that respect the due process of law 
and rights? Why bother with Land Reforms anyway if agrarian justice has proved unattainable in 
Africa’s land reform programmes?  
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